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1. Introduction
The audit market differs from other markets of 
goods and services due to its unique set of char-
acteristics. It plays an important role in preserving 
transparency and improving the functioning of cap-
ital markets. An audit has a purpose only if stake-
holders have confidence in the service provided and 
the auditor’s opinion. 
Moreover, since the statutory audit of financial 
statements is a legal obligation of certain compa-
nies, a significant part of the demand for audit ser-
vices is mandatory. On the other hand, the supply 
side of the market is highly concentrated in most 
of the countries. Given its significant impact on the 
overall economy, it is understandable that the audit 
market is under constant monitoring of regulators 
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and professional bodies to ensure that disturbances 
in this market do not lead to instability of the entire 
financial system. 
Due to the consolidation of large audit firms into 
even larger firms and the demise of Arthur An-
dersen, there are now a handful of global audit firms 
that are able to perform audits of complex institu-
tions. The potential collapse of one of these firms 
would further limit the choice of auditors for major 
enterprises, but more importantly it would damage 
investor trust and could impact the stability of the 
whole financial system. Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider ways to mitigate this risk.
This paper gives an overview of the possible factors 
that led to such a high audit concentration, summa-
rizes prior studies on the level of audit concentra-
tion, and analyses its consequences and potential 
measures suggested by different regulators. Also, an 
empirical research on audit concentration in Croa-
tia was conducted on a sample of listed companies 
from the Zagreb Stock Exchange. The aim is to test 
the hypothesis that the Croatian audit market for 
listed companies is highly concentrated. The results 
can be used to evaluate if the regulators’ concern 
is justified and whether it is necessary to consider 
implementing appropriate measures to reduce the 
concentration and stimulate competition. 
2. Causes of audit market concentration
Measured by revenues or fees received, the Big Four 
audit firms as a group dominate the audit market for 
listed companies in the majority of European Un-
ion countries, with a market share which exceeds 
90% (European Commission, 2010). There appear 
to be several reasons why auditing has become so 
concentrated on four global firms. The degree of 
concentration in the audit market has arisen as a 
direct result of market forces and, in particular, the 
demand from investors for audit quality as well as 
appropriate capability to undertake complex audits 
across the world (House of Lords, 2011a). Large 
audit firms can achieve greater economies of scale 
by spreading certain fixed costs over an expanded 
client base. Their size enables them “to develop suf-
ficient technical expertise and the ability to conduct 
work globally to meet the needs of complex mul-
tinational audit clients and to do so at lower costs 
than could be provided by smaller audit firms” (The 
United States Government Accountability Office, 
2008). 
Besides global reach, reputation is also an impor-
tant driver. The Big Four audit firms are perceived as 
being better at offering value added services on top 
of the audit and providing insurance against reputa-
tional risks. According to the survey conducted by 
Oxera (2006), less than 10% of the United Kingdom 
FTSE 350 companies surveyed would consider us-
ing a mid-tier firm, which again highlights the im-
portance of perception and reputation in this mar-
ket.
Since the International financial reporting stand-
ards are recognized as being complex, a significant 
amount of technical expertise is required by the 
audit firms to adequately advise their clients (Char-
tered Institute of Management Accountants, 2010). 
The Big Four firms have more people in their tech-
nical departments and their staff have more experi-
ence in dealing with similar issues with other multi-
national businesses. Moreover, it is easier for them 
to attract and retain high quality experts. 
Therefore, the internationalization of business, 
reputation, complexity of accounting standards, in-
frastructure investments and economies of scale are 
all factors that represent a major barrier to market 
entry for medium-sized audit firms.
3. Prior studies on audit market concentration
The literature review indicates that there are a varie-
ty of studies focused on measuring the level of audit 
concentration and its effect on variables such as the 
audit quality or audit fees. Some of the studies were 
conducted at the institutional level, while some of 
them were carried out by individual researchers.
3.1 Levels of audit concentration
Measuring the levels of audit concentration was 
the subject of many studies done by regulators and 
individual researchers. Commonly used measures 
of concentration are the Concentration ratio, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, the Gini coefficient 
and the Lorenz curve as a graphic representation of 
inequality in the distribution. However, the results 
of different studies are not always comparable be-
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cause of different methods of calculating the indica-
tors and use of different input data.
Nevertheless, most studies agree that the level of 
audit concentration in most European countries 
is very high. The ESCP Europe analysis from 2009 
showed that EU Member States can be divided into 
four groups according to the overall share of the Big 
Four audit firms, based on the aggregated turno-
ver of companies audited by a certain audit firm. 
Group 1 represents countries with relatively low 
overall market concentration with the share of Big 
Four auditors less than 10%, like the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. On the 
other hand, countries with a share of Big Four au-
ditors above 30% belong to Group 4 (i.e. Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Sweden and the United Kingdom). 
Concentration levels on listed companies are very 
different from overall market concentration levels, 
especially for companies listed on the regulated na-
tional stock exchange. For the 21 analyzed Member 
States, 19 Member States are highly concentrated 
with a Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HH Index) 
above 2000, while only two states are moderately 
concentrated with an HH Index between 1000 and 
2000 (i.e. France and Greece). The EU average for 
the HH Index is 3094 (Le Vourc’h, Morand, 2011). 
The research published in 2010 by Grant Thorn-
ton confirms the dominance of the Big Four firms 
in the biggest Western economies. It found that 
the Big Four firms had an 84% share of audits in 
G8 countries and 70% worldwide. The only big 
European economy where the mid-tier firms have 
a sizeable market share of large company audits is 
France, where joint audits are mandatory. However, 
in many fast-growing emerging economies, audit 
markets are more open. For example, in India the 
Big Four share is only 41% and in China 14%, where 
the majority of companies are audited by firms 
other than the Big Four or mid-tier, many of them 
national firms (Huber, 2011). It should be noted that 
the Chinese audit market is very young, since the 
development began in the 1980s, but with a great 
potential, driven by broader enterprise reforms, the 
development of capital market and foreign invest-
ment (Yang et al., 2003).
When considering the United Kingdom audit mar-
ket, which is a subject of many studies, in 2010, the 
Big Four auditors audited 99 of the FTSE 100 lead-
ing firms and around 240 of the next-biggest FTSE 
250. In some important market segments like bank-
ing, the degree of concentration is even greater, 
since only three of the Big Four auditors audit UK 
banks (House of Lords, 2011a). In addition, switch-
ing rates are low: around 4% on average for all listed 
companies and 2% on average for FTSE 100 com-
panies (Oxera, 2006). This data shows that the Big 
Four’s domination of the large firm audit market in 
the UK is almost complete.
Studies in the United States show similar results. 
According to the Government Accountability Of-
fice (2008), 82% of large public companies (i.e. For-
tune 1000) saw their choice of auditor as limited to 
three or fewer audit firms. In 2006 four largest audit 
firms audited 98% of companies with total revenue 
above 1 billion USD and 96% companies in the cat-
egory above 500 million USD company revenue. 
Although the market is concentrated overall, the 
degree of market concentration and the extent to 
which the largest firms dominate declines with the 
size of public companies.
Due to a number of studies that confirm the domi-
nation of a few large audit firms, it is justified that 
many regulators and interested parties are con-
cerned about the effect of such high market con-
centration on competitiveness, audit quality and 
vulnerability of the whole financial system.
3.2 Consequences of high audit market concen-
tration
Studies on the effects of high audit concentration 
primarily investigated these five segments: 1) bar-
riers to entry for mid-sized audit firms, 2) limited 
choice of auditors for large companies, 3) the effect 
on the level of audit fees, 4) the impact on audit 
quality, and 5) financial system vulnerability.
Significant barriers to entry into the audit market 
for large companies are the consequence of the high 
market power of the Big Four audit firms. These 
main barriers are in particular lack of size or insuf-
ficient capacity in terms of number of auditors in 
mid-tier audit firms, limited geographical reach of 
mid-tier audit firms, a strong preference among 
large companies to choose the Big Four auditors 
because of their reputation, resistance among com-
panies and the absence of incentives to change the 
audit firm (Le Vourc’h, Morand, 2011). Oxera’s 
analysis of the economics of entry by mid-tier firms 
into the UK FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 segments in-
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dicates that the current market structure is likely to 
persist. Market entry is not attractive to firms out-
side the Big Four due the perception bias against 
mid-tier audit firms, the high costs of entry, a long 
payback period for any potential investment and 
significant business risks (Oxera, 2006). Oligopoly 
market structure with a few strong audit firms and 
a high barrier of entry seems to be persistent, which 
is dangerous because it makes it challenging for reg-
ulators to take corrective measures to mitigate or 
eliminate any adverse effects of high concentration. 
Limited choice of auditors follows from the high 
concentration and entry barriers, especially for large 
companies. The reduction in the number of active 
audit firms in the market and especially in the num-
ber of top tier firms reduces client choice and in-
creases the likelihood of conflicts of interest. Com-
panies may find it increasingly difficult to identify a 
top tier firm that neither audits nor provides other 
sensitive services to a major competitor (Beattie et 
al., 2003). The United States Government Account-
ability Office found that 82% of the large companies 
surveyed see their auditor choice as limited to the 
Big Four because those firms have the technical ex-
pertise, capacity and reputation to undertake those 
audits (Bloom, Schirm, 2008). Moreover, over one-
third of the UK FTSE 350 audit committee chairs 
do not feel that their company has sufficient choice 
of auditor (Oxera, 2006). Such a market structure 
where there are only few audit firms on the supply-
side and a larger number of clients on the demand-
side can lead to disorders such as a rise of audit fees 
or a reduction of audit quality.
In theory, oligopoly market structure may result in 
oligopoly firms using their market power to increase 
the price of their goods or services. The effect of the 
high audit concentration on audit fees remains un-
clear because various studies have yielded different 
results. For example, the Oxera study, based on data 
for 1995-2004 from the United Kingdom, showed 
that market concentration and market share of 
a given auditor in a given sector/year both have a 
statistically significant and positive impact on audit 
fees (Oxera, 2006). On the other hand, Eshleman 
(2013) finds that the effect of audit market concen-
tration on the level of audit fees depends on the size 
of the audit market. When the audit market contains 
fewer clients and/or those clients are smaller in size, 
audit fees are increasing in audit market concentra-
tion. In markets where there are a large number of 
clients and/or the clients are large in size, audit mar-
ket concentration leads to lower audit fees. In the 
end, the United States Government Accountability 
Office analyzed the statistical relationship between 
audit fees paid by more than 12 000 companies from 
2000 through 2006. It has come to the conclusion 
that public companies operating in industrial sec-
tors with more concentrated audit markets were 
not paying higher audit fees than companies in sec-
tors with less concentrated audit markets. Although 
audit fees increased significantly on average for all 
sizes of firms, the study indicated that factors other 
than concentration appear to explain audit fees (The 
United States Government Accountability Office, 
2008). Therefore, it is obvious that the results de-
pend on research design and the country in which 
the research was conducted, which means that a 
unique conclusion cannot be derived. 
A similar situation applies to the effect on audit 
quality. From the one perspective, higher concen-
tration could be associated with higher audit quality 
by enabling the auditor to maintain independence. 
If the auditor depends less on a single client and if 
there is a reduced probability of the client switch-
ing auditors, the auditor is in a better negotiation 
position to limit client-driven earning manipula-
tions. On the other hand, audit firms with signifi-
cant market power have the potential to reduce the 
quality of their services because the lack of com-
petitive alternatives would limit clients’ ability to 
obtain services elsewhere. It is unclear and difficult 
to empirically test which of these scenarios prevails. 
Boone et al. (2012) found evidence that auditor con-
centration manifests itself in increased auditor tol-
erance for earnings management by clients (Boone 
et al., 2012). Francis et al. (2013) concluded that 
the Big Four dominance does not appear to harm 
audit quality and is in fact associated with higher 
earnings quality, after controlling for other country 
characteristics that potentially affect earning qual-
ity (Francis et al., 2013). In addition, the US Gov-
ernment Accountability Office and ESCP Europe 
found no compelling evidence that audit quality was 
compromised due to market concentration (Bloom, 
Schirm, 2008; Le Vourc’h, Morand, 2011).
Regardless of the vague effect of high concentra-
tion on audit quality, it is clear that such a market 
structure does not contribute to the stability of the 
financial system. Audit as a service is meaningful 
only if the stakeholders have confidence in the audi-
tor’s opinion. The potential collapse of one of the 
major audit firms could disrupt the availability of 
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audited financial information on large companies, 
damage investor trust and impact the stability of the 
financial system. Therefore, there are concerns that 
the Big Four audit firms have become too dominant 
and that the failure of one of them would cause ma-
jor disruption to the economy (Huber, 2011). It is 
understandable that regulators are considering re-
forms to dilute the Big Four’s dominance and im-
prove competition in the audit market.
4. Possible reforms to reduce the audit market 
concentration
There are many proposals on the reform of the audit 
market in order to reduce concentration, but few of 
them have actually been implemented. Institutions 
like the European Commission, ESCP Europe, the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales, the United States Government Accountabil-
ity Office and the Selected Committee of Economic 
Affairs from the House of Lords have all released re-
ports and studies on this subject. Many of the pro-
posed measures overlap, with the following meas-
ures being most frequently mentioned:
a) Mandatory audit firm rotation,
b) Mandatory joint audit,
c) Regular mandatory tendering of audit contracts,
d) Change in ownership arrangements for audi-
tors,
e) Reform of the law of unlimited liability,
f ) Elimination of covenants which are restricting 
the choice of auditors,
g) Establishment of the contingency plans for the 
potential demise of a Big Four audit firm.
Mandatory audit firm rotation is a measure that 
would limit the period of years that an audit firm 
could serve as the auditor for a particular company. 
It could potentially reduce concentration to the ex-
tent that more opportunities are provided for mid-
size and smaller firms to compete to provide audit 
services to public companies (The United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2008). Moreo-
ver, clients and their auditors would have less incen-
tive to build persistent client-auditor ties, which can 
also have a positive impact on auditor independ-
ence (Gerakos, Syverson, 2015). Italy is one of the 
European Union Member States in which the rota-
tion of audit firms has been mandatory since 1974. 
The maximum rotation frequency is nine years cor-
responding to three three-year mandates. In addi-
tion, there is also a minimum cooling-off period of 
three years before the previous auditor can be re-
appointed. Similar rules exist in Brazil, South Ko-
rea, Singapore and India, while Spain, Austria and 
Canada have abandoned rotation rules (Le Vourc’h, 
Morand, 2011). Opponents to the rotation often ar-
gue that mandatory rotation would not necessarily 
reduce concentration because large public compa-
nies would likely rotate to another one of the largest 
firms. Rather, costs for both audit firms and their 
clients would increase (The United States Govern-
ment Accountability Office, 2008). Hess and Stefani 
(2012) even predict that such measures would result 
in auditor changes from smaller to larger audit firms, 
thereby increasing supplier concentration (Hess, 
Stefani, 2012). Therefore, it is difficult to reach a 
consensus. However, the case of Italy does not go in 
favor of this measure, since the Italian audit market 
has one of the highest Herfidahl-Hirschman Index-
es for listed companies (Le Vourc’h, Morand, 2011).
Joint audits are defined as audits in which two or 
more auditors simultaneously carry out the audit, 
which means that they issue a single audit report 
and share responsibility for the audit (Hess, Stefani, 
2012). In order for it to be effective, there should 
be a ban on the appointment of two Big Four audit 
firms. This would contribute to the growth of mid-
tier firms, enabling them to reach critical size on a 
national basis. Today France is the only EU Mem-
ber State requiring by law joint audits for statutory 
audits of listed companies that publish consolidated 
accounts. In addition, France has a lower than aver-
age concentration level and a mid-tier firm that is 
present on the main index market segment. There 
are several benefits of joint audits. It lowers the 
level of concentration and favors the development 
of mid-tier and small audit firms. Furthermore, it 
minimizes the risk of demise of one of the Big Four 
auditors, since the joint auditor would much more 
easily take on its counterpart’s work than a new en-
trant. It could potentially improve audit quality by 
increasing the overall number of cross-checks (Le 
Vourc’h, Morand, 2011). However, there are costs 
and risks that come along with this measure. The 
presence of two auditors increases coordination 
costs, especially in a consortium of a larger and 
smaller audit firm. Moreover, audit fees are ex-
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pected to be higher and the risk of inconsistencies 
in methodologies is increased (Hess, Stefani, 2012). 
That is why Denmark dropped mandatory joint au-
dits for listed companies in 2005 (Le Vourc’h, Mo-
rand, 2011). Taking into account its benefits and 
drawbacks, this measure needs to be considered as 
a serious option for lowering concentration levels.
Another possible measure is mandatory tendering 
with full transparency as regards the criteria ac-
cording to which the auditor will be appointed. It 
could be a useful measure to make the audit mar-
ket more dynamic, considering the currently low 
switching rates. Regarding the frequency of tender-
ing, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Eng-
land and Wales (2011) recommends that the tender-
ing process should be conducted at least every eight 
years. On the other hand, the UK Select Committee 
on Economic Affairs suggested that UK FTSE 350 
companies carry out a mandatory tender of their 
audit contract every five years, adding that the audit 
committee should be required to include detailed 
reasons for their choice of auditors in their report 
to shareholders (House of Lords, 2011b). The main 
drawbacks identified during the study conducted by 
the ESCP Europe are related to increasing costs for 
both companies and audit firms. Moreover, such a 
measure could lead to a decline of audit quality if it 
results in price wars. Severe competition between 
auditors might enable clients to take advantage of 
the situation to negotiate lower prices. Consequent-
ly, audit quality could suffer (Le Vourc’h, Morand, 
2011). Despite these drawbacks, mandatory tender-
ing would definitely increase transparency in the 
audit market.
All European Union Member States require a ma-
jority of voting rights in audit firms to be held by 
qualified auditors, as stipulated in the European 
Commission Eighth Directive. Some have inter-
preted these specifications more strictly than oth-
ers by requiring 75% or more of the owners of audit 
firms to be qualified auditors (Oxera, 2007). These 
requirements were intended to preserve audit qual-
ity by ensuring auditor independence. However, 
such a rule might limit the growth opportunities for 
audit firms, which is one of the barriers to the entry 
of small and mid-tier audit firms to audit market of 
larger clients. Allowing parties other than the audit 
firm’s partners to own or invest in audit firms could 
increase these firms’ financial resources and allow 
them to hire the additional staff needed to serve 
larger companies. The United States Government 
Accountability Office (2008) interviewed midsize 
and smaller audit firms in order to explore the po-
tential effectiveness of this measure. Several of them 
said that access to capital did not pose a significant 
barrier to expansion because firms currently raised 
sufficient capital through traditional channels such 
as loans. In their experience, shortage of qualified 
staff in the labor market rather than limited access 
to capital was their primary impediment to growth. 
Therefore, it seems that this measure would not 
contribute much to the reduction of audit concen-
tration and the strengthening of small and mid-
sized companies, but to the contrary could have an 
adverse effect on the auditors’ independence.
It has been argued that auditors’ unlimited liability 
discourages non-Big Four auditors from taking on 
large listed clients. Placing caps on auditors’ poten-
tial liability would limit the overall amount that an 
audit firm would have to pay in connection with a 
lawsuit involving the work it performed for one of 
its clients. Even though the basic harmonization re-
gime for statutory audit is unified with the Europe-
an Directive, the liability part is left to the discretion 
of each of the Member States. Practices from differ-
ent countries show that statutory auditors’ liability 
can take different forms. For example, Spain has 
adopted a proportionate liability regime in 2010, 
which means that statutory auditors are now only 
responsible for the amount of damage equal to their 
share of liability, but not for that of other people if 
those people cannot pay. On the other hand, the li-
ability of statutory auditors in Germany is limited 
by a monetary cap set in the German Commercial 
Code (Dufour et al., 2014).
Another possible measure is to ensure equal com-
peting conditions for all participants in the audit 
market. It would mean publicly disclosing or even 
banning all restrictive covenants. Restrictive cov-
enants (i.e. “Big Four-only” clauses) are clauses or 
requirements in contractual agreements between 
companies and their banks that state that only a Big 
Four audit firm can provide audit services to the 
company (Le Vourc’h, Morand, 2011). No particu-
lar measure has been taken to prohibit restrictive 
covenants in Europe and there is still a lack of data 
measuring how widespread this practice is. Prohibi-
tion on bank covenants is expected to have a posi-
tive impact on market competition since they are 
one of the barriers to the development of the mid-
tier audit firms.
In order to limit the vulnerability of the financial 
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system in case of the collapse of one of the big audit 
firms, contingency plans and living wills for major 
audit firms have been suggested. Similar packages 
have already been discussed and introduced for 
large financial institutions, due to the experience 
from the latest global financial crisis. Contingency 
plan should allow for a rapid resolution in the event 
of the demise of a major audit firm, avoid disruption 
in the provision of audit services and prevent fur-
ther structural accumulation of risk in the market 
(European Commission, 2010). Living wills would 
have the same goal, laying out all the information 
the authorities need to separate the good from the 
failing parts of an audit firm so disruption to the fi-
nancial system from a collapse would be minimized 
(House of Lords, 2011b).
It is evident that there are a number of possible 
measures. The reason why they are not widely ap-
plied probably lies in the fear that their disadvantag-
es overcome possible benefits. Moreover, there is no 
clear and convincing evidence that a high concen-
tration reduces audit quality and level of competi-
tiveness, which is why regulators are still reluctant 
to take serious actions. In any case, it is necessary to 
carry out further research on this issue.
5. Methods used in the research of audit 
market concentration in Croatia
The analysis of audit concentration in Croatia 
was conducted on a random sample of companies 
whose securities are listed on the Zagreb Stock Ex-
change, using standard concentration measures like 
the Coefficient rate 4, the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index and the Gini coefficient. Measures based on 
the latest financial data (Financial Agency - Fina), 
i.e. from 2013, are compared to measures from 2008 
to be able to spot trends in the level of concentra-
tion. Results are not fully comparable to those ana-
lyzed from prior studies due to certain differences 
in methodology.
Currently, securities of 165 issuers are listed on the 
Zagreb Stock Exchange. Securities of state and local 
governments were eliminated for the purpose of the 
research, which left 156 public companies. Sample 
size was determined with a 95% confidence level 
and a confidence interval of 10, giving a sample size 
of 60 companies. Concentration measures were cal-
culated using the latest annual financial statements 
and auditor’s reports from 2013. In order to be able 
to spot trends in the audit concentration, measures 
from 2013 were compared with their levels from 
2008. In addition, two companies from each period 
were eliminated from the sample due to the lack of 
financial statements, resulting in a final sample size 
of 58 companies for each year.
5.1 Indicators of market concentration
Three measures have been selected to assess market 
concentration levels: the Concentration rate 4, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the Gini coeffi-
cient. These were also standard measures in previ-
ous empirical studies. Concentration rate measures 
the percentage of the entire reference amount that 
is allocated to the biggest audit firms. Concentra-
tion rate 4 is most commonly reported, calculated 
as a sum of market shares of four largest audit firms:
                  (5.1)
According to Velte and Stiglbauer (2012), oligopoly 
is present if at most three audit companies have a 
market share above 50% or at least five companies 
have a market share above 66.6%. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HH Index) is 
the sum of squares of the market shares of all audit 
firms:
 
    (5.2)
Owing to squaring market shares, the HH Index is 
dominated by large audit firms and only insignifi-
cantly influenced by small carriers. It rates from 1/n 
(in case of minimal concentration and equal share 
of all suppliers) to 10,000 (which indicates a com-
plete concentration). The European legislation uses 
the HH Index to assess horizontal mergers and thus 
isolates three ranges of post-merger HH Index lev-
els: 1) non concentrated markets if the HH Index 
is below 1000, 2) moderately concentrated markets 
if the HH Index is between 1000 and 2000, and 3) 
highly concentrated markets if the HH Index is 
above 2000 (Le Vourc’h, Morand, 2011).
The Gini coefficient summarizes the inequality in 
the distribution of audit market shares between in-
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dividual audit firms. It is derived from the Lorenz 
curve, which plots the cumulative percentage of to-
tal market share against the cumulative number of 
suppliers, starting with the smallest audit firms. If 
all audit firms are the same size, the Lorenz curve is 
a straight diagonal line, called the line of equality. If 
there is any inequality in size, then the Lorenz curve 
falls below the line of equality. The Gini coefficient 
measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a 
hypothetical line of absolute equality, which can be 
approximated by the following formula (Xycoon):
(5.3)
In case of a complete uniform distribution, the Gini 
coefficient assumes the value of 0. When there is a 
perfect competition, the value comes close to 1. If 
the Gini is above 0.9, a very high concentration ex-
ists, while in a situation when the coefficient ranges 
from 0.6 to 0.9 the market is highly concentrated. 
Market concentration is moderate if the Gini is be-
tween 0.4 and 0.6 (Velte, Stiglbauer, 2012).
For the audit market, market shares can be meas-
ured using a variety of metrics, including the num-
ber of clients, audit fees and, since audit fees are not 
publicly disclosed for all audit firms, surrogates for 
audit fees such as client revenues or total assets (Be-
attie et al., 2003). All four variables were used and 
compared in conducting this research. The number 
of clients indicates the number of audit engage-
ments per audit firm, but is not the best measure of 
concentration, given that there are large differences 
in the size of clients. Market share based on audit 
fees is the most representative. However, most com-
panies do not comply with the provisions on the 
publication of audit fees paid for the statutory audit 
in the notes to the financial statements. Therefore, 
total revenues of the audit firm were used as a proxy.
5.2 Sample characteristics
Measures of descriptive statistics were calculated 
for the random sample of 58 listed companies from 
2008 and 2013 (Table 1). This leads to the conclu-
sion that there are considerable variations in the 
size of selected companies. For example, total as-
sets vary from 26 million HRK to 104 billion HRK 
in 2008. In the same year, the minimum total rev-
enue is 119 thousand HRK, while the maximum 
total revenue is 12 billion HRK. Due to significant 
differences among companies, it is obvious that the 
levels of market concentration based on the number 
of clients and those based on clients’ total assets or 
revenues will also take on different values.
Listed companies from the 2008 sample have been 
audited by a total of 32 audit firms, which means 
that each audit firm on average had 1.81 clients (Ta-
ble 2). The maximum number of clients was 9, refer-
ring to one of the Big Four audit firms (i.e. Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers). On the other hand, only 25 audit 
firms have performed statutory audit for the same 
sample of public companies in 2013. The average 
number of clients has increased to 2.32. Two joint 
audits were performed in that period. For the pur-
pose of the research, in case of joint audits, clients 
were equally divided among co-auditors, which re-
sulted in a minimum number of clients of 0.5, since 
one audit firm had no other clients. At the same 
time, 42.86% of the companies in 2013 changed 
their auditor in relation to 2008.
As for the revenue level of audit firms included in 
the sample, the mean rose from 11.4 to 12.2 million 
HRK, with the coefficient of variation of 188% in 
2008 and 163% in 2013. The median is significantly 
lower, since it is not affected by extreme values of 
revenues. The maximum level of revenues in both 
years refers to KPMG.
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Total assets of the listed companies from the sample (in 000 HRK)
2008 2013
Mean 4,410,484.14 5,221,401.69
Median 586,794.13 619,265.73
Standard Deviation 15,251,299.63 18,715,232.83
Range 104,014,321.13 123,699,259.17
Minimum 26,200.76 24,892.77
Maximum 104,040,521.88 123,724,151.94
Sum 255,808,080.32 302,841,298.30
Count 58 58
Total revenues of the listed companies from the sample (in 000 HRK)
2008 2013
Mean 1,165,666.40 1,135,886.91
Median 299,591.41 241,427.73
Standard Deviation 2,318,026.93 2,466,321.07
Range 12,003,634.94 14,757,136.89
Minimum 119.06 321.11
Maximum 12,003,754.00 14,757,458.00
Sum 67,608,651.47 65,881,440.73
Count 58 58
Earnings before tax of the listed companies from the sample (in 000 HRK)
2008 2013
Mean 137,523.20 84,774.00
Median 4,539.91 3,441.72
Standard Deviation 482,146.04 325,844.30
Range 2,985,106.68 1,837,557.85
Minimum -43,170.00 -208,413.69
Maximum 2,941,936.68 1,629,144.16
Sum 7,976,345.36 4,916,892.19
Count 58 58
Altman Z-Score of listed companies from the sample
2008 2013
Mean 1.41 1.31
Median 1.40 1.16
Standard Deviation 2.69 1.29
Range 24.55 6.54
Minimum -14.55 -1.11
Maximum 10.00 5.43
Sum - -
Count 54 54
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of selected variables for listed companies from the sample
Source: Calculated by the authors
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of selected variables for audit firms from the sample
Table 3 Measures of audit concentration for a sample of listed companies in Croatia
Number of clients of audit firms from the sample
2008 2013
Mean 1.81 2.32
Median 1 2
Standard Deviation 1.65 1.91
Range 8 7.5
Minimum 1 0.5
Maximum 9 8
Sum 58 58
Count 32 25
Total revenues of audit firms from the sample (in 000 HRK)
2008 2013
Mean 11,401.60 12,167.00
Median 2,496.70 3,101.21
Standard Deviation 21,423.79 19,777.01
Range 90,748.22 75,175.31
Minimum 115.83 104.64
Maximum 90,864.05 75,279.95
Sum 364,851.14 304,175.11
Count 32 25
Source: Calculated by the authors
Concentration Rate 4 Herfindahl-Hirsch-man Index Gini Coefficient
2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013
Based on the number of clients 36.21 40.52 564.80 659.93 0.36 0.40
Based on the audit firm’s revenue 69.47 67.18 1381.37 1414.58 0.72 0.69
Based on the total assets of clients 89.18 82.70 3074.24 2636.37 0.86 0.82
Based on the total revenues of clients 75.93 63.62 1662.16 1294.42 0.78 0.71
Source: Calculated by the authors
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6. Results and discussion of findings
In order to calculate audit concentration measures, 
market shares were determined based on the num-
ber of clients, audit firm revenue, clients’ total as-
sets and clients’ total revenues. Market shares were 
used to calculate the Coefficient rate 4, the Hefin-
dahl-Hirschman Index and the Gini coefficient, 
wherein the level of inequality was also presented 
on the Lorenz curve. Results are given in Table 3.
The level of concentration is the lowest in a situa-
tion where the market shares are determined using 
the number of clients. According to all three meas-
ures, the audit concentration has increased in 2013 
when compared to 2008. The concentration rate 
4 shows that the four audit firms with the biggest 
market shares audited 36.21% (40.52%) of the to-
tal number of clients in the sample in 2008 (2013). 
Contrary to expectations, only two of them belong 
to the Big Four. In comparison, total market share of 
the Big Four audit firms, measured by the number 
of clients, was 27.59% in 2008 and 34.48% in 2013. 
The HH Index is below 1000, suggesting that the 
market is not concentrated. The same conclusion 
can be derived from the size of the Gini coefficient, 
which is also evident from the graphical representa-
tion in the form of the Lorenz curve (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 Lorenz curve – market share based on 
the number of clients
Source: Created by the authors
The level of audit concentration is significantly 
higher when the measures are based on the total 
revenue of audit firms as a proxy for audit fees. It 
should be noted that these measures should be 
taken with caution due to certain inconsistencies 
in the calculation. More specifically, because of the 
lack of data on audit fees paid by the companies in 
the sample, revenues of audit firms were taken as 
a surrogate.  However, these revenues are not only 
a result of providing services to companies in the 
sample. Therefore, these values will be used only for 
comparison and not to form definite conclusions 
about the level of concentration.
The concentration rate 4 is doubled when the mar-
ket share is based on the auditor’s revenue, which is 
consistent with the increase of other two measures. 
According to these indicators, the audit market of 
listed companies, based on the random sample, is 
moderately to highly concentrated.
In a situation where the data on audit fees paid is 
not available, the most representative measures of 
audit concentration are those based on the size of 
the clients, since it can be assumed that the larger 
client requires more audit work and eventually pays 
a higher fee. According to the total clients’ assets, 
market concentration is very high, with the HH In-
dex above 2600 and the Gini coefficient above 0.8. 
Measures based on the size of the clients’ revenue are 
less alarming: the HH Index is in the interval be-
tween 1000 and 2000, while the Gini coefficient is 
above 0.7. 
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Source: Created by the authors 
Moreover, the suggested decrease in the audit con-
centration in the five-year period is a positive indi-
cator.
In conclusion, the audit market for listed companies 
in Croatia is moderately to highly concentrated, 
depending on the measure used. The conclusions 
drawn from this study are limited by the fact that 
they are based on a sample of listed companies and 
not on a whole population.
Additionally, a correlation analysis between the size 
of the client and its auditor has been conducted. The 
objective is to test if larger public companies hire a 
larger auditor, that is, one of the auditors from the 
Big Four. Total revenues were used as a measure of 
size. Correlation analysis was first conducted sepa-
rately for each year, and then as a pooled correla-
tion. Results in the form of Pearson and Spearman 
correlation coefficients are presented in table 4.
Figure 2 Lorenz curve – market share based on audit firm revenue
Source: Created by the authors
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Figure 3 Lorenz curve – market share based on clients’ total assets
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Source: Created by the authors 
According to the Pearson correlation coefficient, 
which evaluates the linear relationship between the 
variables, the relationship is weak, although techni-
cally positive. Moreover, the result for the year 2013 
is not significant at p < 0.05. 
Table 4 Analysis of correlation between the size of 
the client and its auditor 
However, the Spearman correlation coefficient in-
dicates a stronger measures is that the Spearman 
correlation evaluates the monotonic relationship 
between two variables, where the variables tend to 
change together, but not necessarily at a constant 
rate. Therefore, it is based on the ranked values for 
each variable rather than the raw data. In all three 
cases, the Spearman coefficient takes on values near 
or above 0.5. By normal standards, the association 
between the size of the client and its auditor would 
be considered statistically significant and positive.
Figure 4 Lorenz curve – market share based on clients’ total revenues
Source: Calculated by the authors
Correlation of client’s and auditor’s revenues in 2008
R t p (one-tailed) p (two-tailed) n df
Pearson Correlation  0.4631 3.91 0.000126  0.000251  58  56 
Spearman Correlation  0.4651 3.93  0.000118  0.000236  58  56 
Correlation of client’s and auditor’s revenues in 2013
R t p (one-tailed) p (two-tailed) n df
Pearson Correlation 0.2328 1.79 0.039352 0.078705 58 56
Spearman Correlation 0.5836 5.38 0.000001 0.000002 58 56 
Pooled Correlation of client’s and auditor’s revenues
R t p (one-tailed) p (two-tailed) n df
Pearson Correlation 0.3467 3.95 0.000069 0.000138 116 114
Spearman Correlation 0.5258 6.6 < 0.000001 < 0.000001 116 114
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The Pooled correlation presented in the scatter plot 
(Figure 5) also indicates positive relationship.
Overall results of the empirical research indicate 
that the Croatian audit market for listed companies 
is dominated by large audit firms and that larger cli-
ents to some extent favor the Big Four audit firms. 
This does not necessarily mean that such market 
structure negatively affects audit quality or auditor 
independence, but serves as a warning that addi-
tional analysis should be conducted to investigate 
potential negative effects.
Figure 5 Scatter plot - Pooled Correlation of 
client’s and auditor’s revenues
Source: Created by the authors
7. Conclusion
The requirement to have the annual and consoli-
dated financial statements of certain companies 
audited by qualified professionals is designed to 
protect the public interest. Giving its significant 
impact on the overall economy, it is understandable 
that the audit market is under constant monitoring 
of regulators and professional bodies. One of the is-
sues that has received a lot of attention lately is the 
level of audit concentration. Most studies agree that 
the level of audit concentration in most European 
countries is very high, confirming the dominance of 
the Big Four audit firms. 
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Some of the factors that led to the increase in the 
concentration are the internationalization of busi-
ness, reputation bias, complexity of accounting 
standards, infrastructure investment and econo-
mies of scale. The potential collapse of one of the 
large firms would damage investors’ trust and could 
impact the stability of the whole financial system. In 
addition to the financial system vulnerability, nega-
tive consequences include limited choice of auditors 
for large companies and setting significant barriers 
to entry for mid-sized and small audit firms. The 
effect of high concentration on audit quality and 
audit fees is still vague. Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider ways to mitigate risk. Although there are 
many proposals on the reform of the audit market in 
order to reduce concentration, few of them have ac-
tually been implemented. Most common measures 
refer to mandatory audit firm rotation, mandatory 
joint audit, change in the ownership arrangements 
for auditors, reform of the law of unlimited liability 
and the establishment of the contingency plans for 
potential demise of a Big Four audit firm. 
The analysis of audit concentration in Croatia in 
2008 and 2013 was conducted on a random sample 
of companies whose securities are listed on the Za-
greb Stock Exchange, using standard concentration 
measures like the Coefficient rate 4, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index and the Gini coefficient. The level 
of concentration was the lowest when market shares 
of audit firms were determined using the number 
of clients, indicating that the audit market is not 
concentrated. However, more representative meas-
ures, based on the size of the clients, show differ-
ent results. According to market shares based on 
total clients’ assets and revenues, the audit market 
for listed companies is moderately to highly con-
centrated, with a decrease in the five-year period 
(i.e. 2013 compared to 2008). Moreover, a correla-
tion analysis between the size of the client and its 
auditor, using the Spearman correlation coefficient, 
indicates a statistically significant and positive re-
lationship, which confirms that larger companies 
tend to choose larger auditors, usually one of the Big 
Four. Although the research has reached its aims, 
there were certain limitations. Since the data on au-
dit fees paid was not available, surrogate measures 
based on clients’ size were used to calculate audit 
market shares, such as total clients’ assets and rev-
enues. Moreover, the research was conducted on a 
sample of listed companies, and not on the entire 
population.
Future research could be directed towards expand-
ing audit concentration analysis on unlisted com-
panies. It would be interesting to compare audit 
concentration levels among various sectors and 
company sizes. Moreover, the existing research 
could be upgraded by investigating the effect of 
high audit market concentration on audit quality. 
The direct approach would imply conducting a sur-
vey among internal and external users of statutory 
audit. On the other hand, it could also be tested 
indirectly, by exploring the statistical correlation 
between audit firm’s market share and indicator for 
audit quality, such as level of earnings management 
detected using accrual-based models.
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Koncentracija na tržištu revizijskih usluga
– dokazi iz Republike Hrvatske
Sažetak
Zakonska je revizija u funkciji zaštite javnoga interesa i ima značajan utjecaj na cjelokupno gospodarstvo. 
Postoji zabrinutost da revizijska poduzeća iz skupine „Velike četvorke“ postaju previše dominantna i da bi 
slom jednoga od tih poduzeća doveo do poremećaja cijeloga financijskoga sustava. Ako se kao mjera kon-
centracije uzme udio u prihodima na tržištu revizijskih usluga kotirajućih poduzeća, ukupni tržišni udio 
revizijskih poduzeća iz skupine „Velike četvorke“ prelazi 90% u većini zemalja članica Europske unije. Pre-
thodna su istraživanja pokazala da visoka koncentracija na tržištu revizijskih usluga velikim poduzećima 
ograničava izbor revizora te postavlja visoke prepreke ulasku srednjih revizorskih tvrtki na tržište, dok je 
učinak na revizijsku kvalitetu  i iznos revizijskih naknada još uvijek nejasan. Sukladno tome, regulatori 
razmatraju reforme kojima bi smanjili dominaciju revizorskih poduzeća koja pripadaju „Velikoj četvorci“ i 
poboljšali konkurenciju na tržištu revizijskih usluga. U radu je dan pregled najučestalijih mjera smanjenja 
tržišne koncentracije, od kojih su samo neke predložene, a neke i implementirane, pri čemu se analiziraju 
njihove prednosti i nedostatci. Osim toga, istražene su karakteristike tržišta revizijskih usluga u Republici 
Hrvatskoj, s naglaskom na tržišnu koncentraciju koja je mjerena uobičajenim mjerama kao što su kon-
centracijski omjer, Herfindahl-Hirschmanov indeks i Ginijev koeficijent. Ako se tržišni udjeli revizijskih 
poduzeća mjere na temelju ukupne imovine i ukupnih prihoda klijenata, rezultati pokazuju da je tržište 
revizijskih usluga za kotirajuća poduzeća umjereno do visoko koncentrirano, pri čemu je primjetan trend 
smanjenja u promatranom petogodišnjem razdoblju (2013. godine u odnosu na 2008. godinu).
Ključne riječi: revizija, koncentracija na tržištu revizijskih usluga, revizijska poduzeća iz skupine „Velike 
četvorke”, reforma tržišta revizijskih usluga, tržište revizijskih usluga u Republici Hrvatskoj
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